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interest in the relationship of the parties. 72 This recognition of the
decree as terminating the marital status of the parties is necessary
for the benefit of the federal union.73 Nevertheless, since the same
considerations are not applicable to the incidents of marriage,7 4 Section 1170-b appears to escape constitutional censure.
In order to guarantee the ex-wife the maximum economic protection provided for by Section 1170-b, she should be permitted to
obtain the authorized support even if the New York courts cannot
obtain jurisdiction over the husband or his property. It is submitted
that this might be accomplished by amending the Uniform Support
of Dependents Act to include in its definition of persons liable for
support, an ex-husband, thereby providing that notwithstanding the
fact that he has obtained in any state or country a final ex parte decree of divorce, he shall be deemed legally liable for the support of
his former wife.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Development of New York City Transportation Facilities
In 1827, Abraham Brower offered for the price of one shilling
to transport passengers in a specially constructed carriage along
Broadway as far as Bleecker Street, thus instituting the first urban
transportation system in the United States.' Several years later
horse-drawn omnibuses carried passengers from the Battery to Bond
Street for twelve and one-half cents. 2 By 1835, over one hundred
of these omnibuses regularly transported passengers in New York
City; by 1855, 593 omnibuses were licensed to carry passengers
over twenty-seven established routes.4 Despite this phenomenal expansion and widespread popularity, the omnibus was soon outmoded.
Competition from a newly developed method of transportation-the
72 Since divorce jurisdiction depends on control over the marital res, the
fora of both the husband and wife have concurrent power to grant a decree.
The forum of the wife, however, has a greater interest in the incidents of the
marriage, especially support, inasmuch as it may be called upon to support the
wife should the husband fail to perform his duty.
73 See Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U. S. 279, 282 (1948).
This recognition of the divorce decree will avoid bigamous relationships and the stigmatization of the innocent children of the remarriage.
74See Esenwein v. Commonwealth, supra note 73; Russo v. Russo, 62
N. Y. S. 2d 514, 522 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946).
I MILLER, FARES, PLEASE! 1 (1941).
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at 5.
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4 Hecker, History of Urban Transportation in
TRANSPORTATION 1 (Mossman ed. 1951).
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street railway-had begun in 1832. 5 These horse-drawn cars, operating on steel rails laid in the street, carried riders along the Bowery
from Prince Street to Fourth Avenue at Union Place for twelve and
one-half cents. 6 That street railways were preferred as a means of
municipal transportation became apparent during the 1850's 7when
routes were established on Third, Sixth and Eighth Avenues.
Just as the omnibus bowed to the street railway, so too did the
street railway make way for a more modern method of municipal
transportation. Although the street railway survived until the
1890's, s it became increasingly evident not only that the motive power
supplied by horses was insufficient to attain greater speeds, but also
that the traffic congestion problems which had arisen in the city were
increased by the use of these lumbering vehicles. Consequently, agitation for statutory authorization to construct subway, and, to a lesser
extent, elevated transportation systems resulted in the amendment
of the Railway Act of 1850 to permit rapid transit. 9 From that time
forward, engineers with inventive genius proposed unique systems
of rapid transit. 10 However, only conventional railroad cars, set on
rails elevated above the street, and using cable or steam as the motive
power, were employed."'
The 1870's witnessed the ascendency of rapid transit as the primary method of mass transportation in New York City.' 2 But high
construction and operating expenses acted as a deterrent to its development. These expenses are justified only where the volume of passengers is sufficient to make the operation of rapid transit systems
economically feasible. 13 The introduction of electricity as motive
power, the increasing population of the city, and the concentration
of business in centrally located areas gave impetus to the demand for
subways. Private capital, however, was lacking. Under such circumstances, the Rapid Transit Act, enacted in 1891, permitted cities
of over one million inhabitants to construct such railroads at their
own expense. 14 Within a few years, however, an action was instituted to enjoin the mayor and other officials of New York from tak5Ibid.
6 Ibid.; MILLER, FARES, PLEASE! 20 (1941).
7Id. at 12.
8 Id. at 34.
9
d. at 71.
10 See, e.g., SPEER, SoLUTIoN OF RAPID TRANSIT FOR NEW YoRx CiTy
(1875). The endless train, which was suggested by Mr. Speer, has, in modern
dress, been offered as a replacement for the Grand Central Shuttle. N. Y.
Times, May 14, 1952, p. 29, col. 1.

22 Hecker, History of Urban Transportation in PRINCIPLES OF URBAN
TRANSPORTATION 5 (Mossman ed. 1951).
12 Ibid.
23 See COMMITTEE REPORT, CITY PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION, CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF U. S. 10 (1932).
14 Laws of N. Y. 1891, c. 4, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1894, c. 752, § 7.
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ing advantage of this law. The Court of Appeals, in affirming a dismissal of the complaint, stated that the expending of monies was for
a "city purpose" and was permissible, although the subway would be
leased to a private corporation for its operation. 15 Legal objections
having thus been removed, construction progressed on New York
City's first subway, which began carrying passengers in 1904.16
Although the city owned and financed the construction of many
miles of subways, it did not operate any rapid transit facilities until
the Independent System was constructed in 1932.17

The operation

of this system was entrusted to a Board of Transportation. 8
Municipal ownership and operation of the city's rapid transit facilities was urged in the previous decade, 19 and had received legislative
sanction 2 0 but the assumption of ownership of the facilities of the
private companies could not be effected until constitutional prohibitions were overcome. 2 1 Therefore, to finance the purchase of the
rapid transit systems-one of which was in receivership 2 ---an amendment to the New York State Constitution was ratified, exempting
the cost of the purchase of the transit facilities from New York City's
constitutional debt limit.2 3

The private companies and the city

reached an agreement which was approved by the Transit Commission,24 and municipal operation of the consolidated systems began in
1940.25 The city's venture into the field of operation of transit facil15 Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Mayor of New York, 152 N. Y. 257, 46
N. E. 499 (1897).
1I6iecker, History of Urban Transportation in PRINCIPLES OF URBAN
TRANSPORTATION 5 (Mossman ed. 1951).
17 N. Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1932, p. 1, col. 1.
18 N. Y. RAPID TRANSIT LAW § 32.
19 N. Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1920, p. 3, col. 6.
20 N. Y. PUB. SERv. LAW § 122 et seq. (now incorporated in N. Y. RAPID
TRANSIT LAW).
21 See CUTHELL, REPORT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE TRANSIT COMMISSION
ON PROPOSED PLAN FOR ACQUISITION AND UNIFICATION UNDER PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE BROOKLYN-MANHATTAN TRANSIT SYSTEM 12 (1939)

(hereinafter referred to as REPORT OF COUNSEL ON PROPOSED
TION PLAN).
22 For disposition

Transit System by
UNIFICATION

the

BMT

UNIFICA-

of funds paid to the bankrupt Interborough

Rapid

AND AGREEMENT FOR ACQUISITION AND
UNDER PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE INTERBOROUGH

RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM

city, see PLAN

22 (1939)

(hereinafter referred to as the

IRT

UNIFI-

CATION PLAN).

23 N. Y. CONST. Art. VIII, §7(C) (1938). Under this amendment, city
expenditures for rapid transit facilities up to $300,000,000 were excluded from
its constitutional debt limit.
24 The BMT plan was approved on June 27, 1939, and included the purchase price of $175,000,000. PLAN AND AGREEMENT FOR ACQUISITION AND
UNIFICATION

UNDER

PUBLIC

MANHATTAN TRANSIT SYSTEM

OWNERSHIP

19 (1939)

AND

CONTROL OF THE BROOKLYN-

(hereinafter referred to as the

BMT

UNIFICATION PLAN). The IRT plan was approved soon after and included the
purchase price of $151,248,187.18. IRT UNIFICATION PLAN.
25 The BMT transferred its properties on June 1, 1940; the IRT on June
12, 1940. REPORT, BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION 1 (1940). With the unification

1953 ]

LEGISLATION

ities ended, at least temporarily, when the rapid transit and surface
transit systems owned by the city were leased 26 to the New York
City Transit Authority 27 this past year.
The Problem
In the area of mass municipal transportation, economics and
politics are bedfellows. To inhabitants of large cities, mass transportation facilities are a necessity for reaching places of employment
and amusement. The widescale use of automobiles in a large city
would further complicate traffic problems. 28 In addition, such transportation is unavailable to many persons in the city.2 9

It becomes

the obligation of the government, therefore, to ensure adequate, safe
and rapid transportation facilities for the city's inhabitants. Where
the operation or regulation of transit facilities, which are constantly
used by millions, devolves upon the local government, the management of the system becomes a politically significant factor. It is easy
to see, therefore, why elected municipal officials would prefer to meet
a transit deficit by a tax on real estate, rather than by an increase
of fares. Since the value of property is enhanced by the availability
of transportation facilities,80 this viewpoint is not without justification. However, elected officials cannot realistically continue to charge
transit deficits to real estate, particularly in periods of inflation.
By statutory authority 3 l which transferred to local officials the
power to increase fares on municipal systems, the cost of a ride was
raised to ten cents in 1948.32 The inadequacy of the increased fare
to overcome continually rising transit costs was soon apparent.33
The city's financial situation, as a result, was rapidly becoming precarious. The state rejected a city appeal for outright financial aid,
effected, however, and the assumption of claims against the private companies
by the city, many persons were prevented by Section 289 of the Civil Practice
Act from obtaining necessary testimony since a corporation could not be examined through a former officer. The legislature, therefore, in 1941 amended
that section to permit the taking of depositions where the former officers of a
corporation had become officers of the transferee. See PRASHKER, NEW YORK
PRAcrlcE 537 (2d ed. 1951).
20

See

AGREEMENT OF LEASE BETWEEN THE

CITY

OF

NEW

YORK AND THE

NEW YORK CxTY TRANSIr AUTHORITY 2 (1953) (hereinafter referred to as
the TRANSIT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT).
27 N. Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1800-1821, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1953,
cc. 880, 881.
28 See Jordan, Is Urban Transportation in Danger of Collapse., 50 P. U.
FORT. 903 (1952).

Wright, Problems of Transit Finance, 51 P. U. FORT. 611-612 (1953).
30 Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and PracticalAspects, 47
YALE L. J. 14, 33 (1937).
31
N. Y. RAPm TRANSIT LAW § 36.
32
REPoRT, BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION 82 (1949).
33 N. Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1952, p. 1, col. 4.
29
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but granted the city increased taxing powers on condition that operation of the municipally owned transportation system be turned
over to the Transit Authority.3 4
Summary and Analysis of the Law
The New York City Transit Authority 35 is a public benefit
corporation created by law to operate the transit facilities owned by
the City of New York. 0 Pursuant to this law, the city has leased
to the Authority its transit facilities for a term of ten years.3 7 The
Authority consists of five members, 38 who receive no compensation
for their services.39 All employes of the former Board of Transportation are now under the jurisdiction of the Authority. 40 That body
is empowered to operate, construct, improve and maintain municipally owned transit facilities. 41 Since these facilities must be maintained on a self-sustaining basis, 42 the Authority has the power to
fix rates. 43

It is also empowered to draw up a plan to dispose of

44
municipally owned omnibus facilities to private interests.
To finance improvements, the Authority was given a loan of ten
million dollars by the city, 45 and, in addition, it may issue short-term
notes in anticipation of revenues. 46 Where the expenditures are for
capital costs not formerly listed as operating expenses under municipal control, the Authority may expend up to five million dollars annually, to be supplied by the city, without prior approval of the Board
of Estimate. 47 Any expenditures for capital improvements
above
48
that amount must meet with the consent of the Board.
Since the Authority is a public benefit corporation, it has a separate legal identity, and can sue and be sued.49 Previously tort actions concerning the transit system were generally filed against the

34

35

See Laws of N. Y. 1953, cc. 203, 205, 208.
N. Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1800-1821 (Laws of N. Y. 1953, cc. 201, 202,

as amended,
Laws of N. Y. 1953, cc. 880, 881).
36
Id. § 1802(1).
37 TRANSIT AUTHORITY

3

AGREEMENT

2.

8 N. Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1801(1).
39 Id. § 1801(4). Nor may the members of the board hold any other compensated office in either the city or the state administrations. Id. § 1801(3).
40 Id. § 1810(1). The appointment, promotion and continuance of employment of employes of the Authority are still regulated by the Civil Service Law
and the municipal civil service commission. Id. § 1810(2).
41 Id. § 1804(8), (15).
Generally, contracts let by the Authority must be
by public bidding. Id. § 1809.
42Id. § 1802(1).
43 Id. § 1805.
44
Id. § 1806.
45
Id. § 1803 (2) (d) ; TRANSIT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT 8.
46 N. Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1807.
47 Id. § 1803(1)
48 Ibid.
49

Id. § 1804(1).

(b), as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1953, c. 880.
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City. Nevertheless, a plaintiff suing the Authority in tort must still
comply with Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law.05 In addition, the complaint must allege that notice of the claim has been filed
with the Authority for at least thirty days and no settlement has
be commenced within
been reached.51 In any event, all actions must
52
one year from the occurrence of the injury.
Legal Considerations
The constitutionality of the Transit Authority Act was tested
53
soon after it had been enacted in the case of Salzman v. Impelliteri.
In this taxpayer's action to restrain the Mayor and the Board of
Estimate from appointing members to the Authority and from entering into an agreement to transfer rapid transit facilities to that
body, the city's cross-complaint sought a judgment declaring the act
unconstitutional. One argument offered by the city was that the
New York State Constitution prohibited the city from giving money
or property or lending credit to a public or private corporation. It
further contended that the home rule provisions of the Constitution
were violated. The Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, stated
that since the statute was permissive in nature, and since the state
has a substantial concern in municipal
5 4 transportation, the legislation
was not on its face unconstitutional.
That the city may expend money for the Transit Authority
seems well settled. Cases have repeatedly come before the Court of
Appeals in which objections were made to the expenditures of municipal monies for the construction of rapid transit facilities. Each
time the court pointed out that no constitutional mandates were contravened, although the completed lines were to be leased to private
operating companies, since the city was to retain ownership of the
facilities.r 5 An analogous situation involving a public corporation
was presented to the court in Gaynor v. Marohn.56 In that case, the
constitutionality of a law creating a light, power and heat district for
50

Id. § 1812(2). There is also a provision for continuance against the
Authority of actions pending against the city. Id. § 1818(2). However, the
city has covenanted to be responsible for such claims. TRArsT AuTOrr Y
AGREEMENT 8.
51 N. Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 1812(1).
52 Id. § 1812(2).
53 305 N. Y. 414, 113 N. E. 2d 543 (1953).
54 The dissenting opinion stated that the legislation could not be justified
on the theory that the state has a substantial interest in the city's transportation facilities and pointed out that never before has the state so intervened and
assumed control of municipal matters.

Finally, the opinion questioned whether

the statute was entirely permissive since the city, by failing to accept the
Transit Authority, would be deprived of taxes.
55 See note 91 infra.
56268 N. Y. 417, 198 N. E. 13 (1935).
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Albany county was tested. The Court of Appeals, stating that such
utilities were a state concern, indicated that the cost of erecting and
maintaining these utilities may be charged to the area served.
However, it would seem that municipal home rule in New York
is in need of more accurate definition. Historically, the concept of
home rule may be found in the Roman Empire where many munici57
palities were granted certain privileges of local self-government.
Although municipal government in Great Britain closely parallels
the Roman municipal organization, authorities are generally agreed
that the system of local government as developed in English constitutional history had independent Anglo-Saxon origins.58 During
feudal times, barons in England enfranchised municipalities upon
their lands and permitted them rights of local government. 59 So
firmly was this idea of municipal self-rule implanted upon the minds
of the English that the Magna Carta contained provisions preserving
these local rights and liberties.60 It is, of course, from this English
concept of local self-government that municipal home rule stems.
In the period following the American Revolution, the problem
of local self-government was negligible. 61 New York was primarily
concerned with establishing a stable and firm government. As industry developed and population increased, however, each locality
had its own particular problems, which were not generally related to
the interest of the state. 62 The first attempt, therefore, to redefine
the powers of the state in reference to municipalities was found in the
Constitution of 1894. In that organic act, laws were classified as
general and special, and cities were given the power to veto special legislative enactments relating to their property, affairs or
government. 63
The principle of city home rule, which was considered an inherent right in New York,6 4 found affirmative expression in the adop57 1 MCQUILIIN, MUNICIPAL COPOR.ATIONS § 1.31 (3d ed. 1949).
58 1 id. § 1.56.
59 1 id. § 1.66.
60 MAGNA CARTA § 13.
"Et civitas Londanarium habeat omnes

antiquas
libertates et liberas conuetudines suas, tarn per terras, quarn per aquas.
Praeterea volunus et concedimus quod omnes aliae civitates, et burgi, et villae,

et portus, tbeant omnes libertates et liberas consuetiudines suas."

61N. Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEX, PROBLEMS RELATING TO HoME RULE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 2 (1938).
62 Ibid.
63 N. Y. CoNsT.
section classified cities accord-

Art. XII, § 2 (1894).

ing to population.

This

The legislature was permitted to enact general laws (those

affecting all cities of one or more classifications) regarding their government,
property or affairs. Special city laws, upon passage by the legislature, had to
be submitted to the mayor of the particular city for approval. Where the city

disapproved the bill, or failed to return it within fifteen days, the same session
of the legislature could pass the bill again and, subject to the governor's approval, it would become effective.
64 See People v. Tax Comm'rs, 174 N. Y. 417, 431, 67 N. E. 69, 71 (1903),
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tion of a constitutional amendment in 1923 which not only forbade
the legislature from enacting special laws relating to the property,
affairs or government of a city, 65 but also enumerated the subjects
over which the city had legislative power. 66 Unfortunately, that
which was denied to the legislature was not specifically reserved to
the cities, leaving a legislative "no man's land," 67 and paving the way
for judicial demarcation of the battle line. This much, however,
was evident. The legislature could, by general law, regulate the property, affairs and government of the city. 6s It could, either by general
or special laws, regulate cities in matters other than their property,
affairs or government. 69 It could, by special law, regulate the property, affairs or government of a city under the emergency provisions
of the constitution."
The courts, then, were confronted with two questions regarding
home rule as far as the state legislature was concerned: Was this
act a special law? Does this act apply to the property, affairs or
government of a city?
The test to determine whether or not a law is special is pro72
vided in the constitution. 71 Thus, if a particular city is named,7 3
or if less than all the cities of a class are encompassed by the law,
it is generally considered a special law. However, a law general in
its terms, but local in its effect, was also held to violate home rule
provisions.7 4 Warning of the ever-present danger of nullifying the
aff'd, 199 U. S. 1 (1904) ; see PRAsHKER, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 14 (1927).
But6 5cf. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 187 (1923).
6 N. Y. CONST. Art. XII, § 2 (1894) (as amended in 1923).
1Id. Art. XII, § 3. This section gave cities power to enact laws relating
to: (1) its officers and employes; (2) transaction of its business; (3) disposition of claims against it; (4) acquisition and regulation of its streets and
property; (5) employment conditions of employes of any contractor performing
work for the city; (6) the government and regulation of its inhabitants;
(7) 6 the protection of the property, health and safety of its inhabitants.
7 N. Y. STATE CONSTruTIONAL CONVENTioN CoMmrraE, PRoBLEms RELATING TO HoME RULE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 23-24 (1938).
68 See PRAsHicaR, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 15 (1927).
69
70

Ibid.
Ibid.

71 N. Y. CONsT. Art IX, § 11. "The legislature shall act in relation to the
property, affairs or government of any city only by general laws, which shall
in terms and in effect apply alike to all cities...." (emphasis added). This
section is, in substance, former Section 2 of Article XII of the New York
Constitution which was added in 1923.
72
Ops. N. Y. Arr'y GEN. 263 (1921).
7
3 Holland v. Bankson 290 N. Y. 267, 49 N. E. 2d 16 (1943) ; Osborn v.
Cohen, 272 N. Y. 55, 4 i. E. 2d 289 (1936) (by implication). But cf. Adler
v. Deegan, 251 N. Y. 467, 472, 167 N. E. 705, 709 (1929) (concurring opinion)
(The legislature is not precluded ".... from making a proper classification, based
on population ... although only a single city is... affected....") ; McAneny v.
Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y. 377, 392, 134 N. E. 187, 192 (1922); Admiral
Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 110, 140, 99 N. E. 241, 250 (1912).
74Matter of the Mayor of New York (Elm St.), 246 N. Y. 72, 158 N. E.
24 (1927). The court pointed out that prior to the 1923 amendments, the form
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Home Rule Article by such laws, Judge Cardozo stated that "[a] n
act is not general when the class established by its provisions is at
once so narrow and so arbitrary that duplication of its content is to
be ranked as an unexpected freak of chance .... ,,7"1
The second question presented to the courts is not so easily
solved. The constitutional amendment of 1923 not only failed to
reserve exclusively to the municipality the power to legislate concerning its property, affairs or government, but also failed to define
the terms in its grant to the state. Since these same words-property, affairs or government-had appeared in the 1894 constitution,
the courts continued to give them the same narrow interpretation
after the Home Rule Article had been adopted as before.7 6 In Adler
v. Deegan,77 the Court of Appeals, in upholding the constitutionality
of the Multiple Dwelling Law, rejected a broad definition of these
terms. The state legislature knew and realized, the court observed,
that health measures were state affairs and did not come within the
constitutional prohibition. 78 The test to determine whether a law
refers to the property, affairs or government of a city was suggested
by Judge Cardozo: 79 If the subject of the legislation be in a substantial degree a matter of state concern, the legislature may act,
though intermingled with it are concerns of the locality. In cases
where both the city and the state are concerned, the city may act
until the state intervenes. On,the other hand, Judge Lehman's
dissent 80 maintains that since the people have divided the police
power of the state between the legislature and the municipality, the
true test should be whether the subject matter relates to the property, affairs or government of the city. If it does, the state legislature may act in that field only by general law or by emergency
measures.
Under the theory that the state has a substantial concern in the
subject matter, the courts have also sustained state legislation redefining municipal boundaries; 81 providing unemployment benefits by
levy of a local tax; 82 and regulating ticket brokers,83 light and power
of the enactment, not the substance, was considered.
the test would be whether the law was local in effect.
75 Id.
7

at 78, 158 N. E. at 26.

6 N. Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
LATING TO HOME RULE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

77251 N. Y. 467, 167 N. E. 705 (1929).
78 Id.

Henceforth, however,

COMMITTE,

38 (1938).

PROBLEMtS

RE-

at 476, 167 N. E. at 707.

79 Id. at 491, 167 N. E. at 714 (concurring opinion) ; see Ops. N. Y. ATey

GEN. 316 (1942).

80 See Adler v. Deegan, supra note 77 at 495, 167 N. E. at 715 (dissenting
opinion).
81 City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N. Y. 429, 165 N. E.
836 (1929).
82 N. Y. Steam Corp. v. City of New York, 268 N. Y. 137, 197 N. E. 172
(1935).
83
Kelly-Sullivan, Inc. v. Moss, 174 Misc. 1098, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 491 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 921, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 984 (1st Dep't 1940).
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facilities,8 4 sewers,8 5 and transportation systems 86 of particular
municipalities. On the other hand, the regulation by the state of
working hours for firemen has been held primarily of local concern,
the constitutional conand passage of a special law without fulfilling
7
ditions precedent is violative of home rule.
Much of the major litigation concerning home rule provisions
has centered about New York City transit facilities. Prior to the
adoption of the 1923 Home Rule Article, the Court of Appeals held
that laws pertaining to the transit facilities in cities of over one million inhabitants-while in effect applying only to New York Cityare, nevertheless, general laws, and buttressed their opinions by reiterating that rapid transit is considered a state affair. 88 In one of
these cases, however, where the statute provided that the Board of
Estimate provide funds requested by the State Transit Commission,
Judge Cardozo, although concurring in the result, reserved his judgment as to how far the City of New York may be divested of its
rights in railroads which it owns, without conformity to Article XII,
Section 2 of the Constitution.89 After the Home Rule Article had
been adopted, New York City passed a local law authorizing the
establishment of a municipal bus line. In Browne v. City of New
York,90 the Court of Appeals thwarted that attempt, observing that
there was no specific delegation of such power in the home rule grant
to cities.
The 1938 Constitution of New York, which exempted the purchase price of rapid transit facilities from the city's constitutional
debt limit, also changed the home rule provisions. Under these new
84 Gaynor v. Marohn, 268 N. Y. 417, 198 N. E. 13 (1935) (by implication).
85
Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N. Y. 52, 196 N. E. 740 (1935); Smith
v. Zimmermann, 268 N. Y. 491, 198 N. E. 369 (1935).
8
6 See note 88 infra.
8
7 Holland v. Bankson, 290 N. Y. 267, 49 N. E. 2d 16 (1943); Osborn v.
Cohen, 272 N. Y. 55, 4 N. E. 2d 289 (1936).
88
McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y. 377, 134 N. E. 187 (1922);
Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.-Y. 110, 99 N. E. 241 (1912).
In the McAneny case, the constitutionality of the act creating the Transit

Commission was contested. By that law, the Commission was given the power
to requisition funds from the Board of Estimate. The Board refused to honor
the requisition; hence, the Commission, under statutory authority, petitioned
for an order by the Appellate Division directing payment. The order was
granted, and it is from that order that the Board of Estimate appealed. The
Court of Appeals, in affirming, commented that "[a]ll of the legislation bearing
on the subject has for many years recognized that a duty rested upon the
Legislature to provide for rapid transit . . . a function which the state, in its
sovereign capacity, had a right to exercise . . . since it concerned the whole
state. . . ." Id. at 394, 134 N. E. at 193; see McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N. Y.
401, 414, 153 N. E. 849, 852 (1926).
89 See McAneny v. Board of Estimate, supra note 88 at 395, 134 N. E. at
193 (concurring opinion).

00 241 Ni. Y. 96, 149 Ni. E. 211 (1925).
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amendments, cities not only were specifically given the right to enact
laws relating to their property, affairs or government, but also were
given the power to adopt local laws relating to the ownership and
operation of its transit facilities. 91 Since that amendment, courts
have held that rapid transit continues to be a state affair, 92 and,
therefore, a proper subject of state legislation.
Although the courts have expressed approval of the concept of
home rule for cities, they have nevertheless greatly restricted it. The
disappearance of legislative abuse, the difficulty in establishing a
uniform measure of home rule for cities of varying sizes and interests, and doubt as to the competency of local administrators without
some state supervision are some reasons why the courts have interpreted home rule provisions narrowly. 93 Then, too, as the court
pointed out in City of New York v. Village of Lawrence,9 4 the city
is merely a creature of the state by which it may be modified or abolished. Nor will the courts hesitate to sacrifice home rule in the face
of socially desirable legislation, thus reaffirming the state's right to
exercise its police power even though the subject matter concerns
the property, affairs or government of a municipality.
It is unfortunate that while constitutional amendments attempted to liberalize municipal home rule, the courts have tenaciously
adhered to a rather narrow interpretation of the concept. Judge
Cardozo once said that
Home Rule for cities, adopted by the people with much ado and after many
years of agitation, will be another Statute of Uses, a form of words and little
else, if the courts in applying the new tests shall ignore the new spirit that
dictated their adoption. The municipality is to be protected in its autonomy
against the inroads of evasion.95

How rapidly are the courts fulfilling this prophecy?

91 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. IX, § 12 (1938). "Every city shall have the power to
adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of
the state relating to its property, affairs or government. Every city shall also
have the power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with this constitution and laws of the state, and whether or not such local laws relate to
its property, affairs or government, in respect to the following subjects:
.. . the ownership and operation of its transit facilities. . ...
92 Salzman v. Impelliteri, 305 N. Y. 414, 113 N. E. 2d 543 (1953) ; see
Connolly v. Stand, 192 Misc. 872, 875, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 445, 448 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd memr., 274 App. Div. 877, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 922 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 298 N. Y.
658,9 3 82 N. E. 2d 399 (1948).
N.

Y.

STATE

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

COMMITTEE,

PROBLEMs RE-

LATING TO HOmE RULE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 36 (1938).
94250 N. Y. 429, 165 N. E. 836 (1929).
95 Matter of the Mayor of New York (Elm St.), 246 N. Y. 72, 76, 158

N. E. 24, 25 (1927).
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Comparison with Other Transit Facilities

Municipal transit facilities in the United States may be classified
according to operation into three groups: those operated by private
companies with governmental regulation; those operated by municipal
corporations; and those operated by public benefit corporations. Private operation of municipal transit facilities has been the traditional
method-and the method which the American Chamber of Commerce advocates. 96 But private capital is not attracted to municipal
transportation as a sound investment since the rate of return on the
amount invested-if there is any return at all-is limited.9 7 Municipal operation of transportation facilities 98 was the result of the hopeless financial situation in which many private companies found themselves. Authority operation, the latest experiment in the attempt to
solve municipal transit problems, is the result of alarmingly high
transit deficits. In addition to New York, statutes creating transit
authorities have been enacted in Illinois9 9 Massachusetts 100 and
Wisconsin.' 1 In the Chicago and Boston areas, these authorities
are operating local transportation facilities; Milwaukee has not yet
put the Wisconsin statute into operation.

96 See CoMMIrr
REPORT, CITY PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION,
oF 9CommERcE OF U. S. 14 (1932).

CHAMBER

7 Id. at 13.
98 In Europe, almost all transportation facilities are municipally owned and
operated. See Smith, The Municipally Owned Utility: Profits or Service?, 23

NAT.9 MUNiC. REv. 616 (1934).
9 IrT REv. STAT. c. 111%, §§301-344 (1949).

Chicago passed an ordi-

nance on April 23, 1945, granting to the Chicago Transit Authority the right
to 100
maintain and operate municipal transit facilities for a term of fifty years.
Acts and Resolves of Mass. 1947, c. 544 (Metropolitan Transit Authority
Act).
01
2

Wxs. STAT.

§ 66.94 (1951).
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Conclusions
The transit authorities operating in the various states are required by statute to maintain the facilities on a self-sustaining basis.
Under the Massachusetts 102 and Illinois 103 laws, allowances for depreciation must be included in the cost of service, whereas under the
New York statute,10 4 such capital costs are not included as operating expenses. Consequently, in this state, transit facilities will not
be literally self-sustaining. Capital costs will be furnished from funds
supplied by the Board of Estimate as in the past, and the ultimate
burden of these costs, of course, must be borne by the taxpayers. 0 5
In any event, the exclusion of capital costs from operating expenses
is a tacit acknowledgment by the state legislature that passengers
should not bear the full burden of transit expense. For many years,
New York's transit facilities were operated on the theory that real
estate values were increased by the availability of transportation
facilities; 106 hence, real estate owners should assume part of the burden of transportation costs. There can be no doubt also that industry
and business in the city has been greatly benefited by the development of New York's transportation facilities. 07 The mayor of New
York, realizing this, sought to levy a tax on business to discharge
part of the transit deficit, 08 and although his scheme was not carried
into effect, the logical basis of the plan was recognized. 0 9
The transfer of municipally owned transit facilities to the Transit Authority resulted in further decentralization of transportation
organization in New York. The city regulates the private bus line
franchises; the Authority controls rapid transit facilities. In addition, a Long Island Railroad Authority"o regulates that inter-urban
railway. There is no provision for a single, unified body to regulate
Acts and Resolves

Mass. 1947, c. 544, § 11.

102
of
103 ILL. REV. STAT. C. 111%,
0
1 4 N. Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW

§ 338 (1949).

§ 1802(1). Since the city did not include depre-

ciation under operating expenses, there is no provision for the Transit Authority
to maintain a depreciation fund. N. Y. Times, May 14, 1953, p. 1, col. 3.
105 Other cities pay for various capital costs.
See SUMMARY OF REPORT,
BuREAu

OF ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE

OF PHILADELPHIA 12 (1952).

The Chamber of Commerce believes that cities should bear the cost of construction of transit facilities. CoMMi=rER REPORT, CITY PASSENGER TRANsPORTATION, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF U. S. 23 (1932).
Under the Massachusetts law, if the transit facilities do not become self-sustaining, any deficit
will ultimately be charged pro rata to the participating cities. Acts and Resolves of Mass. 1947, c. 544, § 13.
106 See Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and PracticalAspects,
47 YALE L. J. 14, 33 (1937).
107 See Keith, The Cincinnati Transit Story, 52 P. U. FORT. 86, 93 (1953);
REPORT OF CouNsEL, BMT UNIFICATION PLAN 27.
108 N. Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 1, col. 4.
109 See Wright, Problens of Transit Finance, 51 P. U. FORT. 611, 613 (1953).
110

N. Y. PuB.

AUTH. LAW

§§ 1700-1728.
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transportation in the city; nor is there any provision for a single
organization to develop and regulate suburban transportation. Since
New York City and the surrounding area constitute a single
economic-geographic unit, and since many who are employed in the
city live in suburban areas, the utmost coordination of transit facilities is necessary. 1 ' The Illinois 112 and Massachusetts 113 legislatures have recognized this principle and have given the transit authorities jurisdiction over all transit facilities in the metropolitan
areas.
The main objective of the New York City Transit Authority
is, of course, to operate the city's rapid transit facilities on a selfsustaining basis. Therefore, jurisdiction over the establishment of
fares 114 was transferred to the Authority from the Mayor and Board
of Estimate, thus removing the pressure of local politics from this
problem.
The Transit Authority Act transfers policy-making to the Authority; the day-to-day operations remain substantially unchanged.
But the effect of the transfusion of new blood into the arteries of the
transit system is becoming noticeable. If members of the boardthe gubernatorial and mayoral appointees-can avoid conflict along
political lines, much progress can be made. By reducing service during non-rush hours,"15 and by a closer check over the transit union
to prevent featherbedding,'" the Authority is attempting to reduce
transit costs. The city, of course, could have accomplished all these
innovations, if officials had taken a realistic view of the matter. Now

- S

REPORT, BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION OF CITY

OF Los ANGELES i (1952).
1121Lr. REv. STAT. c. 111%, §303 (1949).
113 Acts and Resolves of Mass. 1947, c. 544, § 1.
114 Pursuant to law, the Authority raised the fare to fifteen cents. In the
first month of operation under this fare, the statistics released showed a 10.4%
decline in passenger rides and an increase of 34.5% in revenues. N. Y. Times,
Sept 4, 1953, p. 17, col. 8. However, statistics covering the second month of
operation indicated that passenger volume had dropped 15% and revenues increased only 29.6% in comparison to the corresponding period a year ago.
N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1953, p. 29, col. 6.
i's N. Y. Times, Sept 25, 1953, p. 23, col. 8. One of the immediate consequences of this announcement was the appointment by the mayor of a commission to study the proposed economies. N. Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1953, p. 23,
col. 4. When the Authority rejected the arbitration committee, the Transit
Workers Union instituted an action to enjoin the Authority from reducing the
train schedules. N. Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1953, p. 1, col. 5. The suit was discontinued and Justice Hart of the Supreme Court was appointed as an impartial adviser to settle the dispute, but the Authority reserved the right to
reject his findings. N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1953, p. 1, col. 1. Quaere: Whether
a Justice of the Supreme Court has such power. See Jacobs v. Steinbrink,
242 App. Div. 197, 273 N. Y. Supp. 498 (2d Dep't 1934).
116 One of the members of the Transit Authority charged that such featherbedding and waste cost the transit lines $12,000,000 annually. He stated that a
fare reduction would be possible if such waste were eliminated. N. Y. Times,
Sept 19, 1953, p. 17, col. 8.
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New York must be content with authority operation for ten years.
Should the city, at that time, reassume control of the rapid transit
facilities, it is to be earnestly hoped that the lessons derived from
authority operation will not be soon forgotten. As for the Authority
itself, it must beware the pitfalls which will necessarily be encountered where boards are, so to speak, a coalition of two opposing interests. A high standard of public duty and efficiency to provide the
best transit service possible to the inhabitants of New York should
be the aim of the Transit Authority.

